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litigation will involve realistic inquiry into the merits of individual
claims, rather than mechanical application of a dogmatic formula-
tion.
Furthermore, the Micallef decision is in conformity with the
view, recently expressed by both the legislative'57 and judicial '"
branches in New York, that rigid, absolute rules of liability which
prevent the assertion of meritorious claims should be replaced with
flexible rules allowing inquiry into the individual merits of each
case. Continued judicial refusal to reexamine a rule that was estab-
lished a quarter-century ago and has since been the subject of much
criticism would have been unjustified, for, as one court stated in a
different context, courts "act in the finest common-law tradition
when [they] adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-
sense justice.' '5 9
Use of term "issue" in a will presumed to encompass illegitimates.
An examination of recent judicial decisions on both the federal
and state levels evinces an increased concern for the rights of illegiti-
mates.'6 The extent to which children born out of wedlock enjoy the
same rights as legitimates is far from settled, however, inasmuch as
conflicting decisions continue to appear.'"' One troublesome ques-
"I See ch. 69, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 95 (McKinney) (codified at CPLR 1411-
13) (comparative negligence statute). It is interesting to note that the legislature's enactment
of this chapter was viewed by some commentators as a legislative overruling of Campo. See
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 134, § 7.02, wherein the authors note that in recommending
the statute to the legislature, the Judicial Conference specifically stated that under the new
statute the patent danger rule should only be a factor in diminishing damages. The Micallef
Court, however, based its decision on other grounds, since the cause of action accrued prior
to the effective date of the comparative negligence law. See CPLR 1413.
"I See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972).
Wg oods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951) (Desmond, J.).
, See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (illegitimates
have right to receive welfare benefits); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(illegitimates have right to receive workmen's compensation death benefits upon death of
father); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimates have standing to sue for wrongful
death of mother); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (father entitled to hearing on
his fitness to retain custody of his illegitimate child); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother has standing to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate child).
Decisions on the state level have had a similar effect. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 75 Misc. 2d
502, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1973) (illegitimates have standing to sue for
wrongful death of father); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Hernandez, 63 Misc. 2d 1058,
314 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) (illegitimates entitled to proceeds of father's
life insurance policy); cf. Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d
Dep't 1972) (father has standing to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate child).
"' While the Supreme Court has struck down as violative of the equal protection clause
several statutory schemes which distinguished between legitimates and illegitimates, see
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tion concerns the right of an illegitimate to take under a will which
bequeaths property to the "issue" of either the testator or some
other party. Recently, the Appellate Division, First Department, in
In re Estate of Hoffman, 12 took an important step towards the elimi-
nation of the legal impediments suffered by illegitimate children by
holding that absent an express intention to the contrary, use of the
word issue in a will encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate
children. 6 3 In so holding, the court expressly overruled well-
established precedent steeped in common law tradition.' 4
In Hoffman, the testatrix's will established a trust for the bene-
fit of her two cousins, and provided that upon the death of one of
the original beneficiaries his share of the income was to pass to his
issue for the remainder of the trust terms. Upon the death of one of
the cousins, his son and daughter became beneficiaries of his share.
Subsequently, the son died, survived by two illegitimate children., 5
Reversing a ruling by the surrogate, the first department held that
the illegitimate children were issue, and were entitled as such to
receive the son's share of the trust income.
Noting that the specific question before it had never been de-
cided by the Court of Appeals, 16 the Hoffman panel was aware of
the existence of a substantial body of lower court precedent holding
that absent an expressed intent of the testator, the word issue is
rebuttably presumed to encompass only legitimate children.'" The
cases cited in note 160 supra, the Court, in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), upheld
the right of a state to exclude illegitimates from the statutory scheme of intestate succession.
Similarly, EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(2), which provides that an illegitimate cannot inherit from his
father in intestacy without a timely order of filiation, has recently been upheld by the Court
of Appeals. In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
2 53 App. Div. 2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
"s Id. at 65, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
166 See cases cited in note 167 infra.
"s 53 App. Div. 2d at 56, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50. In order to legitimize a child born out of
wedlock, his parents must subsequently marry. DRL § 24. For purposes of intestate succes-
sion, however, an illegitimate may always inherit from or through his mother, EPTL § 4-
1.2(a)(1), but may only inherit from his father if "an order of filiation declaring paternity in
a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth
of the child" has been obtained during the father's lifetime. EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(2). In Hoffman,
there had been neither a filiation order nor a subsequent marriage.
"1 53 App. Div. 2d at 58, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
26 Id. at 56, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50. Prior cases interpreted issue as including only legitimate
issue unless a contrary intent is shown. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div.
227, 138 N.Y.S. 884 (2d Dep't 1912); In re Underhill, 176 Misc. 737, 28 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941). Apparently, the reasoning of these cases was not based upon the
statutory scheme or public policy of the state, but rather upon traditional social mores. At
common law an illegitimate child was considered a filius nullius, a son of no one. 53 App.
Div. 2d at 57, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50-51. He was unable to inherit from either parent, nor could
1976l
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court rejected this view as a discriminatory anachronism which
places on the illegitimate an often insurmountable burden of
proof.' "5 It is improper, said the appellate division, for a court
"under the guise of determining the testatrix's intent [to] substi-
tute its own preference as to the legatees who shall take under the
will."'' 9 As further support for its holding, the court declared that if
issue were to have the same meaning as "lawful issue," the word
"lawful" would be rendered meaningless. 70
The Hoffman court also drew upon recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court holding various state statutes that
discriminated against illegitimates to be violative of the equal pro-
tection clause. The Court has condemned legitimacy-based classifi-
cations that precluded illegitimates from maintaining wrongful
death suits,' as well as statutes that barred them from obtaining
the proceeds of workmen's compensation awards.7 2 In a later case,
however, asserting that states have the authority to govern the in-
testate distribution of property, the Court upheld a state statute
which eliminated acknowledged illegitimates from intestate succes-
sion unless escheat is the only alternative.' 73 Notwithstanding this
decision, the Hoffman court declared that equal protection consid-
erations strongly support its decision since to hold otherwise "would
they inherit from him. For a discussion of the reasons for this attitude, see Krause, Equal
Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 489-500 (1967). Such an attitude is far
less prevalent today. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 878 (N.D. 1968),
wherein the court overturned the provisions of the state's intestacy succession statute that
disinherited illegitimates because such an attitude is patently unfair and a denial of equal
protection. But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
53 App. Div. 2d at 56-57, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50. Proving the intent of the testator is a
great burden because for this purpose intent is determined as of the time the instrument is
executed. Determining this intent years later is a very difficult task and, as a practical
matter, the rebuttable presumption often becomes irrebuttable. Reliance on precedent would
have forced the court to substitute an ancient preference for legitimates as legatees or devi-
sees, when in fact this might not accurately reflect the testatrix's intent. See id. at 63 n.8,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 55 n.8.
'"I Id. at 64, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 55. The court also indicated that it could not be said with
any degree of certainty that the testatrix intended to bequeath her property only to the
legitimate issue of the beneficiaries. For the court to impute such an intent to the testatrix
when "the bequest to her cousins was of paramount concern in establishing the trust" would
be to "attribute to her a state of mind not at all supported by the facts." Id.
,7, Id. at 60, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
," Glona v. American Guar. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
,,2 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
," Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). The Louisiana intestacy statute at issue in
Labine was upheld as not violative of the equal protection clause because the Court found
there was a valid state interest in making a quick and final determination of the ownership
of an intestate decedent's property.
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require us to hold that illegitimates enjoyed a lesser status than
legitimate children before the law in cases such as the one before
us."'7 In light of the apparent contradictions in the relevant United
States Supreme Court cases' and the weight of contrary New York
precedent, the first department has taken a bold step. It is submit-
ted that although the rule announced in Hoffman is preferable, the
decision may not be in conformity with present law.
From a social standpoint, the decision rectifies the inequality
borne out of the ancient prejudice which punished the illegitimate
child for the sins of his parents."' Moreover, the traditional pre-
sumption against inclusion of illegitimates may be subject to consti-
"1 53 App. Div. 2d at 66, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (footnote omitted). In light of the sweeping
rationale enunciated in Hoffman, one wonders how the first department would deal with a
challenge to the constitutionality of EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(2), which prohibits an illegitimate from
inheriting from the intestate estate of his father absent a timely order of filiation. Concededly,
a similar statute has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, see note 173 and
accompanying text supra, but this would not preclude a finding that EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(2) is
violative of the state constitution. Such a determination appears highly unlikely, however,
inasmuch as the Court of Appeals has recently upheld the constitutionality of the statute. In
re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975). A strong argument might
be made that by allowing an illegitimate to inherit from the intestate estate of his father only
if an order of filiation is entered within two years of birth, the illegitimate is being unjustly
penalized due to the inaction of one or both of his parents. See Gray & Rudovsky, The Court
Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 25 (1969). A particularly glaring example of
this inequity would be where the parents of the illegitimate enter into an agreement providing
that the father is to provide for the child's support, but do not obtain an order of filiation.
" Commentators have been highly critical of Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
discussed in note 173 supra, because it appears to be inconsistent with Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968),
discussed in text accompanying note 171 supra. See Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates.
Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377, 388-91 (1971); Note,
Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479 (1974). One commentator has
pointed out, as indicative of the inconsistency, that at least one court confronted with an
intestacy succession law that disinherited illegitimates in the period between Levy and
Labine invalidated the statute relying on Levy. Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates,
Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377, 385-86 (1971), citing In
re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968). Although the cases can be distinguished in
that Labine involved property rights, whereas the Levy and Glona decisions sounded in tort,
many commentators have criticized Labine as lacking a sound analytical basis because the
Supreme Court upheld the intestacy statute with apparent disregard for the consequences of
the statutory scheme. Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377, 389 (1971); Note, Labine v. Vincent: Louisiana
Denies Intestate Succession Rights to Illegitimates, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 428, 447 (1971).
Prior to Labine, many commentators had expected that illegitimacy would be characterized
as a "suspect" classification. Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479
(1974).
"' See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 498-500
(1966).
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tutional attack as a violation of the equal protection clause, 77 since
the aforementioned decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have raised a serious implication that most legitimacy-based classi-
fications are not rationally related to any valid state purpose .7
Nothing in New York's statutory scheme explicitly precludes
the result in Hoffman, although the decision does engender some
inconsistency. EPTL section 1-2.10 defines issue simply as "de-
scendants in any degree from a common ancestor,' '1 9 thus leaving
it unclear whether the term embraces illegitimates.'5 0 While many
sections of the EPTL refer to issue or similar terms, only one such
provision expressly includes illegitimates.1'8 This express inclusion
in one section might lead to the conclusion that those provisions
which are silent on the matter should be interpreted as excluding
illegitimates. Such a harsh result, however, finds little support. In
its report to the legislature, the Temporary Commission on Estates
recommended a sympathetic attitude toward illegitimate chil-
dren.'8 2 Indeed, the Commission's primary concern was with fairness
and equity for all parties involved. The Commission stated:
The recommendations of this report are intended to grant to illegi-
timates in so far as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with
those enjoyed by legitimate children while protecting innocent
adults and those rightfully interested in their estates from frau-
dulent claims of heirship . . .
Interpreting this report, one noted commentator has concluded that
"[any doubt as to whether an illegitimate child qualifies under a
given section of the EPTL should be resolved in favor of inclusion
of the illegitimate.' '8 4 It would appear therefore that illegitimate
," 53 App. Div. 2d at 66, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 57. The Hoffman court noted that judicial use
of the presumption that the term issue encompasses only legitimate children could constitute
state action since it was "nothing more than the substitution of judicial preference for a
testator's intent." Id., 385 N.Y.S.2d at 56, citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'Is See cases cited in notes 171-72 supra.
"' EPTL § 1-2.10(2).
" See 9 P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1-2.10[2] (1975).
,"' EPTL § 3-3.3(b) provides in pertinent part that "as used in this section the terms
'issue,' 'surviving issue,' and 'issue surviving' include adopted children and illegitimate chil-
dren." Other sections of the EPTL use such terms as "issue," "children," "heirs," and
"distributees" without specifically including illegitimates within their meaning. E.g.. EPTL
§§ 5-4.4(a), 6-5.6, 6-5.8.
,42 See TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF
THE LAW OF ESTATES, FOURTH REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, at 233-68 (1965).
"' Id. at 265-66.
Is, 9 P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 4-1.214], at 4-60 (1975). Professor Rohan
states that the Commission was aware of cases which were favorable to illegitimates and did
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children should be included within the term issue as defined in
section 1-2.10. Although the section 1-2.10 definition is not determi-
native in construing a will, this interpretation supports the holding
reached by the Hoffman court.
One unfortunate result of the Hoffman decision is that it does
create an apparent anomaly in New York law. The Court of Appeals
has recently upheld the constitutionality of EPTL section
4-1.2(a), 15 which provides that in intestacy, an illegitimate is to
inherit both from and through his natural mother, but only from his
father, and even then only if there has been an order of filiation
entered within two years of birth. Although Hoffman obviously did
not fall within the ambit of section 4-1.2(a) since it involved a con-
struction problem, the court's use of a presumption favoring illegiti-
mates to allow inheritance through the father does seem somewhat
inconsistent with the continued viability of section 4-1.2(a).
It is submitted that this inconsistency would best be resolved
not by a return to the presumption against illegitimates, but rather
by amendment of the statutory scheme. Thus, EPTL section 4-
1.2(a) should be amended to permit an illegitimate to inherit from
and through his father in all cases. The legislature should also
amend the EPTL to provide that words such as "issue," "children,"
and "descendants," be construed to include illegitimates absent a
clear contrary intention,' thereby codifying the Hoffman decision.
Even without these changes, however, Hoffman indicates that
draftsmen must take great care in preparing a will so that the testa-
tor's intent is indicated by the exact wording. Thus, to prevent
illegitimates from inheriting, a bequest or devise should be specifi-
cally limited to legitimates." 7
not disapprove of them. Id. Most commentators favor inclusion of the illegitimate in class
gifts. See, e.g., id. ( ) 4-1.2[5]; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY T 339, 359,
360 (P. Rohan ed. 1974). See also Krause, Bring the Bastard into the Great Society-A
Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829 (1966). Section 18 of Professor
Krause's proposed act deals with inheritance. Id. at 839.
"s In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975).
"' EPTL § 1-2.10, which defines issue, should be amended to include illegitimates.
Moreover, EPTL § 2-1.3, which provides that absent a contrary intent a disposition to issue
includes adopted and posthumous children, should also be amended to include illegitimates.
I" See Note, Testamentary Dispositions to "Children" as Including Illegitimates-A
Change in Wisconsin Law?, 57 MARQ. L. RFv. 173, 182-86 (1973).
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